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ABSTRACT 
Thie paper contains a microeconomic analysis of the infl.ience 
of change• in relative prices on the direction of inventive activity. A 
control-theory model of a firm which produces final output and also 
performs research and development is developed. It is assumed that 
the output of R le D is factor-augmenting technical change. An in­
novation poasibility frontier for the firm is defined and conditions are 
foand under which it le convex. The major theorems relate the 
change• in innovation in re•ponse to changing factor prices to the 
elasticity of eubatitution in producing final output and to the nature 
of the production functions for innovation. Two special cases are 
examined in detail. When current innovation pouibilitiea are appro­
priately independent of past innovations, the rate of factor augmenta­
tion ta the same for all factors where relative prices are constant 
at any level. Comparing time paths with different,con11tant relative 
prices gives conditions under which an inc reas e in the pr ice of a factor 
directs innovation into lines which economize on that factor. A 
summary of earlier results on similar subjects is included • 
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1. 
FACTOR BIAS AND INNOVATIONS: 
A MICROECONOMIC APPROACH 
by 
W. David Montgomery and Jame• Quirk 
CalUornia Institute of Technology 
This paper l• concerned with a claasic question in the theory 
of 1.DDovat1on11, namely, the question "does an increase in the -ge rate 
lead towarcb an increase in the production and ue of labor-ugmenting 
Innovations?" Section Z of thi• paper contains a brief survey of the 
literature dealing with this question. Most of the existing literature takes 
a macroeconomic approach to the problem of factor augmentation bias 
and in addition directs its attention only at the � of innovations, with 
the menu of innovations available to the society being taken as given 
exo1enously. Our approach in this paper is microeconomic, in order 
to deal explicitly with the issue of allocation of resources to the production 
of lnnovatlon1 and with the responsiveness of that product i on to the price 
sliJlah provided by the factor markets. Because of aggregation problems 
the conclusions derived in this paper do not necessarily c arry over in a 
direct fashion to macro models of the economy, but at least certain 
issues are raised by those conclusions that are relevant to the study of 
innovation in a macro context. 
Briefly, the model that we employ is that of a profit-maximizing 
firm that produces a final output and also engages in "in h ouse'' R & D 
activities that re1ult in the production of labo� and capital-augmenting 
innovations specialized to the final product production proces s . The 
firm is auumed to be a monop olist in the market for its final product. f l J 
5< 
2. 
We assume that the firm's production activities can be summarized in 
terms of well-behaved neoclassical production functions. The notion 
of an "innovations possibilities set" is introduced at the level of the 
firm, and we show that the set is convex, with strict conve.ll:ity occurring 
only if there is decreasing returns to scale in the production of innovations. 
These results are the microcounterparts of the Kennedy postul&te of 
convexity of the aggregate innovations possibilities set. 
The profit-maximizing choices of the firm are derived from a 
control-theory formulation of the firm's activities. The wage - rental 
ratio Is assumed to be fixed over time, and we attempt to analyze '"·e 
consequences for labo�and capital-augmenting innovations of a s hift in 
that -ge - rental ratio.CZ J
.By considering a relatively extensive model of the inn ovat ing firm, 
we can examine several complicating features of innovation. Thf' fiTSt 1:1 
the dependence of current innovation possibilities on past innovative ac tivity. 
The second is the influence of changes In factor prices on the choice '=>f 
innovative inputs, since the same factors as are augmented may ther:111"IV"'S 
be used to produce innovations. Each of these considerations can producto 
paradoxical results as to the influence of prlcee on the direc tion of technical 
change. We es tablish first those few properties of te chnical change which 
do not depend on specillc au umpt ions on the form of the dependence of 
current innovations pos sibilit ies on past innovative activity. Then by 
examining simple cases we show how the compllcations descri bed make 
it impos sible to state in general how changing factor prices will affect 
innovation. 
Specific results are obtained for two s pecial cases: first, the 
case in which the percentage rate of increase in augmentation is independent 
of the le vels of s uch augmentation; and s econd , the case where the output 
of factor-augmenting innova tions is independent of the levels of a ugmentatinl" .. 
These �wo ca s es exhibit quite different ''cornparative dynam ic " propPrti•, 
and illustrate the dependence of the concl11sions reacbcd concer'1ing th-· 
responsiveness of outputs of innovations, on the assumptions made 
concerning the characteristics of the production processes employed 
by the firm. 
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z. At least mince J. R. Hicks' conjecture in the Theory of Wages 
that increases in the wage rate call forth labor-saving innovations, 
it ha• been recognized that changing factor prices may affect innovation. 
The conjecture is, as we shall show, not obviously true. Nor has it 
been unchallenged. Fellner (1962) and Salter (1960) have argued precisely 
the opposite. that although an anticipated change in prices might bias 
inventive activity, there is no reason to expect a difference in innovation 
under conditions of continuing high wages than under continuing high profits. 
The arguments by both authors ar e based on the idea that the firm does 
not care what kind of costs are reduced; it simply wants to reduce total 
co11ta as quickly as possible. 
Two separate points appear at issue. One relates to exogenous 
trends l.-. Innovation or innovation possibilities, and disagreements arise 
from �U'cring priors on the direction of exogenous trends.[3 ] The other 
polnt. �·'-i-:-h we address in this paper, is whether and how, in a world 
with� exogenous trend, innovations will respond to prices.
Despite the important role which technical progress has played 
in models o! economic growth , the problem of determining how the bias 
in technical change will respond to changes in factor prices has never been
the subject of a complete formal analysis. Analysis of induced technical
change has concentrated mainly on finding conditions under which the 
economy will have a long- run balanced growth path consistent with 
a limited set of "stylized facts." In the major recent treatments of induced 
innovation [Samuelson '.196!>), Conlisk ( 1 969 ) . Nordhaus (1 969), Drandakis 
and Phelps ( 1966) ], it is as surned that the quantity of labor to be employed 
11 determined exogenously, and the quantity of capital is determined by 
6< 
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saving and investment. Equilibrium and optimal growth paths are found 
by appropriate opti mizations using labor and capital supplies to define 
constraints. This approach Is fundamentally macroeconomic. 
Although these models focus on the question of how to choose 
from among an exogenously given set of innovation possibilities, they 
arrive at results which a.re special cases of the model in which innovations 
are literally produced. A brief survey of these results will set the stage 
for the models of this paper. 
Samuelson ( 1965) examines a formal model of Innovation using 
Kennedy' a (1964) idea of an innovation po1111ibility frontier [IPF]. We reviae 
bls notation to be consistent with ours. A111ume a production function 
F(•, • ) which is homogeneous of degree one. U technical progre&11 is 
factor augmenting we can define the variables of the production function 
to be A(t)K, B(t)L, so that Y = F(A(t)K, B(t)L). The various derivativea 
will be represented as follows: 
8F 
8{A(tlK) = Fl 
dA • 
dt = A 
A A'= a 
8F 
8(B(t)LJ = F z 
dB • 
dt = B 
B 
8 = b .  
Some identities will b e  used frequently : 
v 
£K 
aK AF l 
8F 
aL 
BF2 •
Since F is homogeneous of degree one we can define 
A(t)K _ (A(t)K ' __ I_ 
B(t)L and f(vl - F B(t)L ,  11 - B(t)L F(A(t)K, B(t)L) 
where f'(v) = FI 
f - vf'(v) = F2. 
We can call v the "augmented cap1taJ-J.;,bor. ��lo." 
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The share of capital in output, OK' can be defined in terms of 
F 1 or of f'. Let r = price of K, w = price of L. Then 
"K 
Similarly 
aL 
aK 
"'L 
rK &F K _ AKF 1 vf' 
y = &K F - -F- = f 
wL &FL 
Y = &LF 
vf' 
� ·  
BLFZ
F 
f - vf' = -
f
-
FollowlJ11 Samuelson we define a coat function 
c( A�tl • :io) 
where C = min rK + wL 
K,L 
F(A(t)K, B(t)L) 
s ubje ct to 
l. 
Samuelson exploits certain "duality" relations between C and F. Define 
cl
ac 
af _!__ ' \A(tl 
CZ
� ( w \ • a B(t�
Samuelson states tha t 
and that 
!£. ar 
rK 
CF 
!i 
F" 
tr K 
K BF 
F aK 
ac 
aw 
so that 
L 
F '
ac ar 
C1 
A(t) 
ac 
aw 1 B( t) 
7< 
wL L aF - - a - - -CF L - F aL. 
b 
Finally, Samuelson a ssume s an exogen ous innovation possibility frontier, 
written 
b = f(a) 
where f'(a) < 0, f"(a) < O. 
Samuelson assumes that firms act to minimize the instantaneous 
rate of reduction in unit coat. The rate is obtained by evaluating ��IC 
ac d ( r ) d ( w )
M = Cl dt A(t) + CZ dt B(t) 
[ ;. :BJ � w - c{-z + czw-z + 'i 'A + �iiA B 
. . [a c A ac BJ &c. ac . - -r- + -w- + -r + - w 
8r A aw B &r aw 
- [� . � + wL . �] + !ir· + �w - F A  F B F  F '
C rK wL r K . L · 1 
- c: =CF a+ CFb - LcFr +-crw_ 
= er Ka + tr b _ i 
Kr t Lwl
L L CF I 
The firm choose• a and b to maximize thl1 expre!sion subject to 
b = f(a). Sub1tituting and differentiating we have 
d 
da [a Ka +a Lf(a) J 
o + o f'(a)K L 
f '(a) crK oL 
0 
7 "' 
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Under the aaaumed condition• f'(a) < 0, f"(a) < 0 we can solve 
for the inverse function 
°K [ l] °K 
1(cr L)
= f' - (a L) • 
where g' £" < O. By successive eliminations we can obtain an 
expreaaion 
-· = b(f'ID· 
By uaing the firat order condition• we obtain aK and 
a 
L in terma of 
AK and BL; further aubatitutlon enable• ua to expreu AK and BL in 
r w 
term• of the ratio A I B. Thua 
a 
d(;K) 
L 
g' 
• d(���
h' 
d(AKJ BL, 
d (� I ID 
We can determine the sign of each derivative. 
•gn I' 
By .;.v .. vell.l.ty 
d(AK)
s1n BL 
ci(� 'm 
0 
By aaaumption 
The sign of d\a
:; Id(��) depends on the elasti city of substitution. 
.a I\ d1-1 
_y 
d·tAK' 
\ BU 
d ( vf' \ 
dv f - vf'/
( f - vf') (vf" + f') - vf' ( f' - vf" - f' ) 
( f - vf ' J 2 
8< 
Since 
_ vff" + f'(f - vf') -
z (£ - vf') 
_ f'vff" f'(f - vf') - + • 
a
f'(f � Vf1)2 (f - vf')z 
IT : 
f'(f - vf') 
vfr' 
d(�) _i £' f' - + --
rl(!�) -IT f - vf' 
f' - 1Tf' 
IC -fT(f - yfl) 
IT - 1 
IT 
f' 
f - vf•" 
Since f' > 0 and £ - vf' > 0 by aasumption, 
dE
�
) � �  
d(��) < 
0 +-0> 11 � 1. 
< 
Therefore h' � 0 � <T � 1 . 
< < 
B 
Drandakis and Phelps ( 1966) anume that the firm maximize• 
the inatantaneous proportionate rate of growth In output with fixed Inputs. 
Writing Y = F(K, L, t). they define 
R 
Ft
F '
which Is to be maximized. Bias they define as 
D 82F a2FaKat - aLat MK - ML. 
Assuming factor augmentation, they obtain an expression 
R 8F[A(t)K, B(t)L] /F 8t 
= 
F1KA FZLB
8F 8F 
;. aK K B iLL 
;;� + ii� F + --F 
;. 8 
=crKA+!tL B
crKa +crLb,
which is the same maximand a• Samuelson'•· 
lzi an Appendix, Drandakis and Phelps derive the following 
expression for bias 
D !....:..!(b - a). fT 
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'rhu• whether or not an increase in the augmentation coefficient for a 
factor results in a reduction in the use of that factor (in natural units) 
depends on the elasticity of substitution. For a < l the expected results 
hold. 
3. We next examine the properties of a model of in house R & D 
conducted by a firm that produces a final product that inco rporates the 
Innovations produced by the R & D labs. We are particularly interested 
in the "''1lY in which profit-maximizing behavior leads to an allocation of 
resources between the production of capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting 
In novations in response to the market wage - rental situation. 
' 
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The model ls as simple as pouible. The firm ls assumed to 
be a monopolist in the market for its final output Y, produced using 
labor L1 and capital K 1 hired in competitive factor markets. Labor 
and capital used in the production of the final product are augmented by 
innovations produced in the R & D operations of the firm. Thus AK 1 
and BL1 represent the effective amounts of capital and labor employed 
in producing the final output. 
R &. D activities are summarized in two production activities, 
one producing capital-augmenting innovations, A, with the other pro­
ducing labor-augmenting innova tions , B. Innovations are assumed to be 
specialized to labor and capital employed in producing the fir m ' s final 
output , so that the labor and capital used in the R & D departments are
aot augmented by the innovations produced. L2 and K2 represent ta•,.,,. 
and capita l e mploye d to produce � while L3 and K3 denote labor and 
capital u1 ed in the production of B. 
Before turning to the condition• character izing .'\ pr ufit-maximh • ni:: 
time path for the firm, we first explore the properties of the "inno•rationa 
possibllitle• set" for the fh·m. The "in-hou•e" innovations possibilities 
set 11 defined as those combination• of A and B that can be oLtained 
for a given cost in terms of capital and labor, assuming that A and B 
are fixed. 
To obtain the outer boundary of this set, we solve the following 
problem. 
Max A = ¢(K2, L2, A, B) 
subject to (11 B = C 
!where B 0 l(K3
, L3, A, 8)): • 
(2) w(Lz t L�) t r(Kz + K31 " M
tJ and 1' are assl:rned to be Lr,rnogeneou" of �ume P•>•itiv"" rl<'t;"·�c 
Je11 than or equal to I ,  and t> anrl "!' ?.re ciua•i- ccncave. 
9< 
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Let H = ¢ + >.1(1' - Cl + >.z(M - w(Lz + L3) - r(K2 t K3)). 
At a constrained maximum we have 
(l) •K - r>..z = o (v) 'f-C= O
(ill f L - it>.,z = 0 (vi) M - w(LZ + L3) - r(K2 + k3) = 0 
(ill) >-1 'f K - r>. Z = 0
(iv) >.. 1 'f L - w>.. Z = O 
¢KK fKL 0 0 0 -r
¢LK ¢LL 
0 0 0 -w 
0 0 'KK 'fKL tK 
Let A• = I 
-r 
0 0 tLK 'fLL f L -w 
0 0 tK tL 0 0 
-r -w -r -w 0 0 
ther. ' r  .. g.ilar constrained maximum, A• has the property that I A*l > 
given by 
The slope of the boundary of the innovations possibilities set is 
dA 
d! 
-'KdKZ + ¢ L d
LZ 
'fKdK3 + 'fL
dL3 
From ( 2), wdL2 
+ rdK
2 
-(wdL3 + rdK3l 
while from (il - (iv),
dA 
dB 
r) 2
dK2 • w) !d
L2 
, A z , 
\" 
r\-'dK • w-"-dL :\I' 3 ',). 1' 3 
o. 
�o�
if 
It thus follows that the innovations possibilities set is convex
d). l 
dB � O. 
Differentiating the first order conditions with respect to B
we obtain the system 
¢KK ¢KL 
0 0 0 -r dK2 I I 0 
¢LK ¢LL 
0 0 0 -w dL2 I I 0 
0 0 'fKK 'fKL f K -r dK3 I I 0 
0 0 'fLK fLL 'f L -w dL3 I I 
0
0 0 tK tL 0 0 d). l dB 
-r -w -r -w 0 0 d>..z. I I 0 
• d>..1 
Hence 
Ass where A;S ia the cofactor formed by deletingd!"" = I A*I 
the fUth row and column from A*. 
d>. l 
� 
By block multiplication we have 
• Ass
= I 
+ 
¢KK 
¢LK 
'fKK 
'fLK 
¢KL 
G!LL 
'fKL 
'fLL 
. 
'KK 'fKL -r 
'LK 'fLL 
-w
-r -w 0 
¢KK ¢ KL 
-r 
¢LK G!LL -
w 
- r -w 0 
1f ¢ and 'f are homogeneous of degree one, then A�S ' 0 and
O, If <:: and 'f arP homogeneous of positive degrer less than one,
12 
A 
13 
note that I YK K  1KL -r YKK 'l'KL "f K 
YLK 1LL -w = (��) z JLK JLL 'fL 
-r -w 0 JK YL 0 
while I lfKK 41KL -r 41KK ¢KL ¢K 
G) z lfLK lfLL -w = 41LK ¢LL ¢L 
-r -w 0 fK ¢L 
0 
Under quad-concavity and positive homogeneity of degree le•• than one, 
both of the•e expre••ions are po•itive. 
Hence we conclude that when ¢ and 'f exhibit constant return•, 
the IP •et i• convex with a straight line outer boundary. Under decreasing 
returns to scale, homogeneity and quasi-concavity, the IP set is convex 
with the outer boundary a •trictly concave function. The cases are shown below. 
& L ..< < C ? D B 
Constant returns to ¢ and '!' 
A 
..._�--C..-"--L-___..<---L-_._ ____ a 
Decreasing rrturns to ¢ and 'f 
The In-Housr I. P. Set 
(Note t'iat because A and B arl" assumed Jixed, precis<:>ly the same diagrams 
appear .!"'" replace A by A A an·l P bv B 'BJ. 
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-�- furning to the implications of profit maximization for the allocation 
of resource• within the firm, the firm's problem may be formulated as 
follows. 
{"' 6t ma.x Jo (p(Y)F(AK1, BL1) - wL - rK)e 
- dt
Subject to A 
B 
¢(A, B, KZLZ) 
'!'(A, B, K3L3) 
where L 
K 
A(o1 = A0 
LI + Lz + L3 
Kl + Kz + K3, 
B(O) BO 
Y = F(AK1, nL1) 
-6t Let H = (pF - wL - rK)e + >.1GI + >.2"f 
First order conditions are given byf 4J
-6t (I) ((MR) F 1A - r)e = 0 
-6t (Z) ((MR)F 2B - w)e = 0 
(3) -
6t -re +).1¢K = O 
(4) -6t -we + :i.1¢L = 0 
(5) -6t -re + ).2'!'K 
0 
(6) -
6t +).2'fL = O  -we 
t -6t (7) I = -(MR)F1K1e -). ¢ .. A t 1 A Z A
. -M ( 8) X z = - (MR) F 2 L le - ).1 itr B - A 2 TD 
(9) A = GI 
110) a - ,
with transversality conditions lim :i. 1 = 0, lim),2 = O; 
, ..... t-+a. 
where MR = p + ?..P. Fl 
BF Fl 
=�[�) 
d Y' i:l(AK11' i:l(RLI J • 
ii< 
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We will work with the special case in which p(Y) is assumed to 
utiafy lim p(Y) = +•, lim p(Y) = 0, p(Y) 2: 0 for all Y 2: 0 with � < 0 
y-.o Y-++• 
for all Y � 0. Further, F, ¢, and 'f are assumed to be "well behaved" 
neoclassical production functions. In particular F is homogeneous of 
degree one ln AK1, BL1, while ¢ and 'f are homoge_neous of degree one 
ln K2, L2, and K3, L3 respectively. 
Th1111 F(AK1,BL1) = BL1F(v1,I);; BL1f(v1) where v1 
AK1
= BL-. I 
Further, Um f(v1) = +•, Jim f(v1) = 0, f(v1) 2: 0 for v1 2: 0 and Vr-+0 Vt-++• 
f'(Y1) > 0, f"(v11 < 0 for v1 2: O. 
Similarly, let ¢(A . B, K2, L2) = a(A)G(K2, L2l = a(A)L2g(v 2> 
while 'f(A, B, K3, L3) y(B)H(K3, L3) = y(B)L3h(v3) where 
KZ 
K3 
vz = 'L· v
3 
= L""· g and hare assumed to obey the •ame neocla•dcal
z 3 
properties u t.f 6 J
Flnally, let u1 = ;,.1e
6t 
�lz = "A.2e
6t
Thus the first order 
c�nd1uons may be rewritten as follows. 
(l ') [(MR)Af' - r)e -f,t = 0 (6') - w + uz(h - v3h')y = 0 
(Z') [ (MR )B (f - v1f') - w]e-llt = 0 (7') µl = bu1 - (MR)f'K1 - u1<>'Lzg 
(3') - r + u l g'o- = 0 (8') uz = tuz - (MR)(f - v1f'lL1 
(4') - w + ul(g - vzg')<> = 0 - u zv ' L 3
h 
(5') -r+u2h'y = o (91) A = <>(AlL2g(v2l 
(10') B = y(H)L1h(v3) 
Let w 
w 
w 
r Then (l') - (6') can be used to establish that
B 1 Z 3 [f - V f'] g - V g I h - V h 1 :A -1-· - = g' = h' 
16 
We are particularly concerned with the case where w is constant 
over time. For that case we have 
w 0 _.,., .. ___.._ v z z 
(g') 
-hh" 
Ch'lz 
v3 
Under the neocla•sical conditions, v2 and v3 are uniquely determined 
by w, and are con.tant over time when w is constant. 
Further, given w, A. and B, v 1 is uniquely determined, while 
ci = 0 implies that 
vi A B 
VJ = IT{ c�·-5) 
where IT 
f 
i• the elasticity of sub•titution between augmented capital and 
augmented labor in the production of the firm' 11 final product.
Kl A Let q1 = L so that v1 = Bq1• We then obtain l 
ql
(*) -
ql 
(<Tf - l) (� - l) · 
This result corresponds to that obtain<'d by Samuelson (l'HiS). 
It asserts the following. 
(ii If <T f = 1 so that F is Cobb-Douglas, the capital-labor ratio in 
produ cing the firm's final product is ind<'pendent of the relative rates of 
innovation so far as capital and labor augmentation is concerned; 
1.2< 
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(ii) U a f > I, then the capital-labor ratio in producing the final 
product increases if the rate of increase in capital-augmenting innovations 
exceeds the rate of increase in labor-augmenting innovations, and conv�rsely; 
(iil) U a f < 
1, the capital-labor ratio in producing the final product 
falls if th� rate of increase in capital-augmenting innovations exceeds the 
ratio of increase in labor-augmenting innovations, and conversely. 
Thus far we have only exploited the cost-minimizing properties 
of the model. The properties that follow from profit maximization can be 
derived a• followa. 
Note that conditions (l ') - ( 1 O') are all identities in t. Differentiating 
(3') with respect to t give• 
For 
-r + u1g'o'A + µ.1era"v2+ag•µ 1 = o 
;., 0, v z = 0 and iJ I 
r a•A 
erg' 
-
1-11-;;-· 
From (7'), µ1 = 6i,J1 - (MR)f1K1 - u1a"L2g. 
Since A = oL2g, we have 
r ... . +­(MR)f'K1 = �l og'
6r + r 
erg' 
Similarly, uaing (5') and (8') we ha ve 
(MR)(f - v1f')L1 
6r + r 
yh' 
It follows that 
f' ) - .Y..!!.: 
( f - v f' q l - 0 g' ,1 
A h'which Implies q1 = -8 .. i"-\, in turn \erg' I 
, .. , 
qi 
qi 
(�_!)+�_er'.� l.B B y er 
leading to 
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This condition might be contrasted with that derived earlier, namely 
(•) 
qi 
ql 
(a - 11(� - �)f A B 
Both (*) and (**) must hold simultaneously along a profit-maximizing 
time path. There are of course a multitude of cases that might be of interest 
in the study of factor bias and innovation. Here we look only at those cases 
in which a "quasi-steady state" is achieved in the sense that the capital-labor 
ratios in all three activitiea (F, �,'fl are constant over time, i.e. , case• in 
which q 1 = 0 i• an identity in t.f7J 
For such cases, ·the analysis of "comparative dynamics" 111 
particularly simple, eapeclally in attempting to determine the impact on 
the aystem of a change in the wage-rental ratio w. 
Cue 1. A/A and B/ B independent of A and B. 
Recently, Ahmad (1966) and Nordhau11 (
1973) have emphasized the 
critical importance of the level of technological progreu on the rate of 
advance of such progresaJ8J Their comments are best undereto��y 
considering the case in which the rate of progress is independent nf the 
level already achieved. In terms of the model developed here, this is th,. 
caae where o(A) = CA, Y(B)" C2B for some constants c1, c2. Wt! take c1, c2 to I h' be unity. From(*"') q1 = 0 for all t with q1 =w(-;-). Ir "c; l ,  then
• g � • � = 0 from("') and hence v1 = �q1 is also conftllt.nt over time at 
A (h'� . ;. B the level v1 = B -u• goi · Since A = L2g(v2 ) ,  B = L3h(v3). we have 
L2g(v2) = L3h(v3J. 
Consider a change in .i: and its effects on the system. 
h' From q1 = u.:-, we have g' 
dql 
dw 
/!;'h"-3- - h'g" -2 ' 
riv dv ) u.:\--d-�l\�-2---·�- t � 
,. ...... ..t..u< 
, 
But 
hence 
dv3
dw 
Z dvz.:!IT > O, dwhh" 
z
.:.iLl_ > 0, gg" 
(dq1 
-
-lh'lz .!:!:\ �
dw - W 'h + ' f I II g I g 
h' (-h' o' l\ 11- + .... + - l 
g' h g w I 
l 
dql 
ql d;" :: [ -
1 1 l
] --- + -- + - > o. w+v3 w+v2 w 
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Thus, when A/A and B/B are independent of A and B, an increase 
in the wage-rental ratio increases the capital-labor ratios in both final 
goods production and in the R Ii: D operations of the firm. 
Further, 
and 
where 
with 
= !! e- v, f') w A f' so that 
( •/) (;"' � 
i!w = --, d(B/A) - '�IA -- dv f (f' ) l l 
dw A I dvl - = -d (B /A ) + --w B erf v1 
A dv 1 = B dq1 + q1d(A/B) 
dv I dql B - = - +-d(A/B) v
i qi A 
dql A = -- - - dlB'Al. 
ql 
B 
d A er, - I cq ___-!, = -d ( B/A1 [ -·--" + J_ _ _l. 
� B er 
f - 0 f q I 
14< 
For IT! 1- l, 
and 
� d(B/A) _ [� 1 r.!. _l_ dqli 
B dw - IT f -lJ 1 u: - IT fq 1 dw J 
[ "'f l 
{
l 1 ( l l 
ITf -
1_ ;;;- -crf ;;;-
+ tL+v2
,, ' 
- � J. - , . ..  � 
_w_d(B/A) 
(B/A) dw 
er [_f l { l - _!_ ( l
"'c-
l
_ erf 
' !.I.' 't---w + v -
2 
_.1' _ \l 
J. - V I r 3 . 
w (v3 - ,.2,.:.. , 
= - f(IT - l) + l IT f - 1 I f (W + V z) ( U.' + VJ )J 
1 w(v3 - vz) 
l + --- ----''--,.__;;;.._ (O' f- l) (w + vz)(w + v3) 
zo 
Thus the sign of 
d(!'A) depends on the elasticity of substitution 
of augmented capital and labor in producing the final output, together with 
the relative capital intensities of labor and capital-augmenting innovations.
In general we have 
w(v3 - vz) > I 
< 
d(B/A) � 0 < > 
� (w + vz)(w + v3) dw f 
- l 
Still, it is worthwhile Identifying explicitly certain cases in which 
the " expected" result occurs in that an increase in the wage- rental ratio 
increases the output of labor-augmenting innovations relative to c apital­
augmenting innovations. 
First, if both innovative activities have the same capital intensities, 
then B/A incr eases with increases in u:. 
Second, rrf > I and v3 �Z; that is if labor and capital are good 
substitutes for one another so far as the final good is concerned, and labor­
augment i ng innovations arc r"1atively more capital intensive than�� 
augmenting innovations, BI A increases with iv. 
2.1 
Third, "t < I and Vz_?__v3, the case in which there is poor su bstitu t ­
ability In pro ducing the final good and capital-augmenting innovations are
more capital intensive than labor -augmenting innovations, Bl A aga in 
increases with w.
Thus even in the special case where rates of cha nge of innovative 
activity are i ndepe ndent of the levels achieved, the question as to whether
an increase in the wage- rent al ratio leads to co ncentr ation on labor­
augmenting inno vat ions rests on the empirical properties of the productio n
relations within the firm. 
Case 2.. A and B independent of A and B. 
A second case in whi ch quasi-steady states occur is that in which
the outputs of the innovative activities (and not simply the per cen tage rates
of change of such outputs) are indepen dent of the levels achieved. In terms 
of our model, this is the case where a-(A) = c1, y(B) = C 2 for some fixed
constants c1 and CZ. To simplify things, we take these constants both
to be unity. By (**) we have 
'11 .A 8 y'B a•A. 
- = ---+ ---
ql A B y a 
A 'B 
A" --a· 
on the other hand, by (*) 
ql 
ql
(CT - 1 J (A - �) l A B 
Hence if CT 
f 
# 2, A I B is constant over time, with A h' ) q = -w(-1 B ,g ' 
Then 
with 
F ro m 
d �h
' \ h' 
( g'h"dv h' "d ) 
ql = B\-g • du: +  -;-•.i·d(A/BI + �
ll' 3 - g vz 
g B 
(g') 
2 
L dq1 
q1 
dw 
I 
-+B/A
d<A/B 
w 
- ,/ 
dw 
B l - v l f' 
·x = A" (--r, ) 
I - 1 I ) 
w + v 3 + ;;;-+_;-; 
I - CT 
(--�� � u f -; B dw 
( l l dql 1 
I;;; - a fq l d",';J 15< 
I dql Substituting for - d, we obta : ,,_ 
qi 
w 
A d(B/A) B dw 
A d(B/A) w- ---B dw 
{; (I I \ CT f
f(l-CT I CT f f 
� - w : v3)} 
--=-- -
�- :v)} - - ,-2 
_!_ {1 J. ,. : - "2) I - CT • -------{ ' � ' + v3)J CT f .. .. 1tJ. 
Thus for a f < 
I and v 3 2!_ v2. an increase in the wage -rent al 
2.2 
ratio leads to an e xpan sion of oul1>ut of l abo r-augment in g innovations rel11tlve 
to capital-augmenting inno vat io ns , while if CT > I and v ..... v the opposite [ z c:. 3 result obt ain s. Note that t hes e are quite different ca se s than tho&P idP"fifi,.d 
in Case I above. 
Finally, consi de r the case v.·here o(A) Am, y(B) - Brn· 
ql By(**), - = (I - m) [A - �] 
qi B h . 
'{ 
For CT 
f I 
2 - m, (*) implies 1 
q I 
' 0 with A/R constant o•,o;r tirn .. , 
and with q
1 tt:(�l (�)m· 
I
g' I A 
110 that 
(B)m-I rh'\ h' Thus dq = - I - ch + ·-tt(rn I A \g'/ 8' fl!) m- 2 - l)\A d([l/A) 
B m-1 [g' h"dv 3 - h' !?"<iv 21 
+ 
(-) w A 
(g')
2 
dql 
q1 dw 
A d{D/A) , -I I ) t (m • 1)- I\-- +-- . ll' B dw :i., + v 3 w i v 2. 
B f- v 1f• From w A (--1-, -) and with IT f I 1 we have 
� d(B/A) = �{.! _  l _ dql} 
B dw l - IT f w IT !qi dw 
l dql Substituting for ·- -d , we obtain 
ql w 
:u(v - v zl } � d(B/A) = __ l _ { 11 - ITf) + (w + v\(w + v3l ' W B  dw IT!-m 2 
Clearly the cases m = l (c:r(A) = c1A, y(B) = c2B) and
. = 0 p(A) = c1, y(B) = C2) are covered by the above formula. 
�tR./ A I , he sign of  clearly depends crucially on m. 
We also note that 
w dql --
ql cb 
l + (.!!!..:...!) IT1-m(l 
w(v3 - v2) [ITf - l ]
- IT) +  ---£ (w + v 3 )(w + v 2) IT! _ m 
Form = 0, 
:.u dql ' ITC -1 w(v3 - vz) J c1; dQ" = l .. � [ l • (w + v 3Hw + v zl 
Thu• for that special case at least, the response of the capital­
•bor ratio in producing the final product to changes in ti! depends on the 
lasticity of substitution and on the relative capital intensities in the 
111ovating 1ector. 
There are no doubt other "quasi-steady state" situations where 
Z3 
omparative dynamic results could be obtained. For example, in the 
obb-Douglas case, q1 is determint>d by lV and is con!tant over time, but 
Z4 
A/B generally is time dependent in t::-"! case. What we have tried to do 
is to indicate the fact that in the cont�x: ::if a profit-maximizing model, the 
link• between the wage-rental ratio a.:-.::'. the direction of in novative activity 
are generally quite complex and that :'.-.e,-e are no obvious simple generalizations 
even under "quasi-steady state" conC.::ions. 
16< 
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FOOTNOTES 
I. Nordhaus ( 1969) has argued convincingly that under the auumptions 
we make about the manner in which innovations are produced and 
used, the production of innovations is only consistent with a compe­
titive market structure under unrealistic conditions which also 
complicate the analysis to an unmanageable degree. On the other 
band, the model we employ can be viewed as one in which an inde­
pendent producer of innovations sells his innovations to a competi ­
tive industry, capturing the monopoly profits from the production 
of innovations. Excluding the case of "big" innovations (see Arrow 
(1962 )), the analysis is identical in either formulation of the model. 
2. Note that in this model the firm is � about all present and 
future prices , and abou t the nature of the innovation wh i ch will 
result from the use of s pecific q uantities of inputs to innovative 
activity. 
3. Two im portant contributions to the thPory of induced innovation 
•• 
by 1\ hmad (1966) and Nordhaus (1Q71) are left out of this survey 
becaus e they concentrate on the classification of b ias in exogenous 
trends . 
We ha\'e ignored non-negati\·ity constraints on the control and 
sta te variables becau s e of the sprcial assumptions to be imposed 
on P, F. :. and'!' as noted belove. 
s. 
2.b 
'The first order conditions as st:ated differ in t\� � cr-.:.cial respects 
from t.hose obtained by maximi•dng the instanta::eot:s rate of cost 
reduction. First, the explicit consideration of :'.:e factor i nputs 
to innovation implies that simply considering what happens to the
p;:i-cf! of a factor us ed in final goods production does not provide 
sufficient information to allow conclusions about bias in technical 
progress. If that factor is also used in innovation, then additional 
conditions are needed. Second, the conditions for profit maximi­
zation over time depend on more than relative shares. 
6. We have assumed a kind of "strong independence" with respect to 
the production of innovations in that " is independen t of B, and 'I' 
is independent of A. This amounts to assuming the la c k of int er ­
dependence in research activities with respec-t to c-apital - and l<tbor­
augmenting inn<>vations , and is at best a simpliflic-ation that is hard 
to justify except in terms of the ease of manipulation of thP moJPI. 
The aame is true of the separability assumptions relating to� "nrl y. 
7 .  When prices are constant over time and q1 = 0, both factor � are 
always augmented at the same proportional rate. indepPndently of 
the size of w. When w is dif!erent between time paths, only the 
relative levels of augmentation , not the rates , are changed. This 
would appear to s up port and cl arify Fellner's argurnent. 
8. Ahmad � 1966) has pointed out the contrast between the r('s ults 
:f7< 
obtained when the IPF relates A/A to BIR anrl the results when it 
relates A to B, and the i mportance of specifying how the current 
innovation poss ib ilit i es depend on past choice's hd11ch imply current 
levels of A and 81. Nordhalls (l'l73irlisp"s"s <>f tht> rel .. ,a,,ceuf ,\hrrio'i's 
conclusions to i.irowth theorv by showinr U.at a nec<'ssar\· r<>nditior: 
for balanced growth equilihriurn is t hat the lf'F a �  h(b, A, ri: f ,' 
i ndepende nt of Bin thP. <ense Clh/()!1 - 8. TherP is at ''"'"ta 
27 
surface eimilarity between the Nordhaus condition and the caee11 
to be examlned here. !Iowever, it should be emphaeized that our 
model is explicitly concerned with the endogenous production of 
innovations, while the Ahmad approach is one in which ·movements of 
the IPF are determined exogenously, subject only to their dependence 
on the levels of A and B already achieved. It might be that there is 
eome closer connection between Nordhaus's notion of independence 
and that employed here, but it has not been possible as yet to 
discover such a connection. 
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